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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
This paper intends to provide the empirical answer to the question “Did Japanese banks make 
adjustments of quality of lending supply in response to a large negative capital shock under the BIS 
risk based capital regulatory framework?  If so, how?”  It was in FY 1997 that Japanese banks 
finally recognized a huge amount of non-performing loans under the strong regulatory pressure and 
that they went through a huge loss of capital.  Bank capital, already having been damaged by a 
series of negative events in the financial crisis that had surfaced since FY 1995, reached the level 
low enough to bring up the regulatory intervention as a real threat.  A bank in response may have 
reduced the risk exposure by shifting their supply of loans to high quality borrowers.  Such a 
behavior is often referred to as the “flight to quality”.  The bank may, on the contrary, have kept 
low quality borrowers alive by supplying more loans to them and thereby prevented NPLs from 
surfacing on its financial statements.  This is a behavior popularly called the “ever-greening” or the 
“forbearance lending”. 
The empirical answer to our question has interesting policy implications.  If bank loans are 
directed from low quality borrowers to high quality borrowers, the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission still plays an important role of propagating the easing effects into 
productive borrowers, and public recapitalization of banks prevent them from reducing credit supply 
to high quality borrowers.  If the direction of supply of loans is exactly opposite, the policy mix of 
easing monetary policy and recapitalization leads to the inefficient financial support of unproductive 
industries and firms.  If this is the case, the policymakers should instead consider stimulating 
lending demand of productive borrower firms.  Borrowers, not banks, are the source of problems. 
    The methodological contribution of this paper is use of the unique identification strategy that 
exploits the banks' structural behavioral changes in the 1980s under financial liberalization.  Banks 
shifted their lending portfolio toward real estate lending under the bullish expectations on land 
prices.  Entering 1990s, the land price bubble was burst and large portion of real estate lending 
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became non-performing.  Thus the higher real estate lending share in the late 1980s explains the 
higher non performing loans (NPLs) and lower bank capital in the late 1990s.  Use of the real 
estate lending share within the bank’s loan portfolio in the end of 1980s, which is very strongly 
correlated with bank capital almost a decade later, as an instrument allows us to identify the lending 
supply function with the possible demand side capital-borrowing relationship.  Loans are 
disaggregated into loans to the industries where NPLs concentrate (low quality borrowers) and those 
to the industries where NPLs are minor presence (high quality borrowers) and the redistribution of 
supply of loans across two groups of borrowers in response to a bank capital shock is examined. 
The paper is organized as following.  In section 2, the bank’s possible behavioral reactions in 
response to a loss of its own capital are discussed, and the relevant literature is reviewed.  In 
section 3, data and econometric issues are examined.  In section 4, empirical results are reported.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Loss of bank capital, flight to quality, credit crunch, and ever-greening 
A loss of bank capital occurred through such various adverse events as the bank’s contribution 
to the liquidation of jusen housing loan companies, the declining bank profitability, and distrust in 
the banking industry by market participants.1  It was, however, the regulator’s switch to the tougher 
stance against banks by urging them the very rigorous self-assessment of their assets in FY 1997 that 
resulted in the unprecedented scale of loss of bank capital.  Until then most of NPLs had been left 
unrecognized and had not appeared on the banks’ financial statements.2 
The RBC regulatory framework requires banks to satisfy the minimum standard for the ratio of 
                                                  
1 Distrust in the Japanese banking industry by market participants surfaced as the Japan premium in 1996 and 
1997.  In the Eurodollar and Euroyen inter-bank markets, lenders charged Japanese banks higher rates than other 
international banks.  See Peek and Rosengren (2001). 
2 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) provide the best summary source of chronology of the Japanese financial crisis. 
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capital to risk weighted assets (riskier assets are assigned to higher weights), the so called RBC 
ratio.3  Lending has been assigned 100% irrespective of credit risks of each contract (credit 
worthiness of each borrower).  Introduction of the prompt corrective action framework (PCA) in 
FY 1997, which allows the regulator to intervene into banks with the RBC capital ratio below the 
regulatory minimum, made failure to achieve the minimum standard particularly costly for banks.4 
What can a bank do if a large loss of capital brings down the RBC ratio to the level close to the 
regulatory minimum?  Asymmetric information -- involving investors, a bank, and borrowers -- 
makes issuing the new equity costly.5  There are, however, potentially three ways for the bank to 
raise the RBC ratio without issuing equity.  Firstly, if associated costs are negligible, the bank may 
examine individual lending contracts (or at least individual borrowers), and reduce riskier loans, 
while holding safer loans.  This is the bank's flight to quality in response to a negative capital shock.  
Secondly, if such costs are prohibitively high, banks may cut supply of loans irrespective of 
borrowers' credit worthiness.  This is credit crunch.  Lastly, the bank can be engaged in the 
so-called ever-greening of borrowers who have great difficulty in servicing their debts.  Supply of 
additional loans to such borrowers not only allows them to fulfill their contractual obligations on the 
previous debts but also helps the lender bank prevent realizations of NPLs on its financial statements.  
This paper sheds light on the banks’ adjustments on the quality of supply of loans in response to a 
large loss of their own capital, namely tests the ever-greening hypothesis against the flight to quality 
                                                  
3 The franework was agreed in the Basel Accord and took full effect for fiscal year for 1993 in Japan.  All banks 
publicly reported ratios under the Japanese Bankers Association (zenginkyo) criteria.  The principle of the 
regulation is that banks exposed to higher risks should hold more equity capital as a buffer. 
4 The regulatory minimum is the Basel standard of 8 percent for banks that conduct international businesses and 4 
percent for those that operate only domestically.  It is only major banks that pertained to the PCA in the 
introductory year of FY 1997.  However, other banks must have foreseen the PCA’s greater coverage of the 
banking industry. 
5 See Stein (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) for discussions on the bank’s cost of issuing equity due to the 
asymmetric information. 
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hypothesis by examining shifts of supply of loans among borrowers with varied financial strength.6 
The hypotheses have been tested by comparing small business lending with loans to larger 
firms with various sets of data from both the US and abroad, on the ground that creditors should 
reduce loans to opaque small firms in times of losses of capital (Bernanke and Lown [1991], Peek 
and Rosengren [1995], Hancock and Wilcox [1998], Berger, Klapper, and Udell [2001]).  The 
results are not very conclusive. 7   Since banks as relationship lenders establish long-term 
relationships with borrowers through rounds of lending contracts, small firms are not necessarily 
more opaque to banks than larger firms are.8  Thus, this traditional approach may be misleading. 
A growing number of recent empirical works support ever-greening by Japanese banks.  
Kobayashi, Saita, and Sekine (2002) present that the growth of loans to highly leveraged firms 
accelerates.  Peek and Rosengren (2004) find that a main bank with a strong relationship with a 
firm is likely to extend credit to the firm in response to financial deterioration of a firm and a lender 
itself than a non-relationship lender.9 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
Empirical model 
Consider the following equation. 
                                                  
6 According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), credit supply to 
borrowers with higher net worth is greater than to those with lower net worth under the optimal contract, when 
there is the asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower.  The allocation of credit supply is 
accelerated in the wake of a negative shock to creditors such as tightening monetary policy and a loss of bank 
capital. 
7 Gertler and Gilchrist [1994], Oliner and Rudebusch [1995, 1996], and Lang and Nakamura [1995] support the 
banks' flight to quality in response to tightening monetary. 
8 For the empirical evidence of banks as relationship lenders, see Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan 
(1994, 2002), Cole (1998), Degryse and Cayseele (2000) and Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001).   
9 For the extensive literature review, see Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2003) and Kobayashi, Saita, and Sekine 
(2003). 
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The dependent variable Litj is the lending growth of an individual bank i to the j’th group of 
industries at date t.  Explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable and the difference 
between actual and target levels of the capital to asset ratio, Kit/Ait-(Ki/Ai)*, which we call capital 
“surplus” (“shortage” if it is negative). 10  Xi is a set of dummy variables that control for the bank’s 
institutional characteristics, CITY, TRUST, and REGIONAL, which indicate a city bank, a trust 
bank, and a regional bank respectively.  Since each group of banks has had the distinct customer 
base, it is meant to control the lending demand.11  εjit is the error term. 
As Van den Heuvel (2002) shows, when a bank maximizes the expected sum of future dividend 
payouts under the Basel regulatory framework, it starts to cut back on its lending supply only when 
its capital to asset ratio is sufficiently close to but above the regulatory minimum.  How earlier the 
bank acts in response to a loss of capital, which is the buffer to the regulatory minimum for the 
forward-looking bank, depends on the bank's characteristics such as risk averseness, size and 
institutional and legal status.12  The bank specific target on the capital asset ratio (Ki/Ai)* models the 
point that triggers the bank’s action. 
 
Data and sample selection 
The main data source of bank level data is the Nikkei NEEDS bank financials data bank, which 
                                                  
10 In fact we subtract the regulatory minimum from the RBC ratio in the level specification until FY 1996, since 
most "international" banks stay above the 8 percent regulatory minimum whereas "domestic" banks stay around 
their 4 percent regulatory minimum.  The distinction between both regulatory types became less obvious after 
many "international" banks switched their regulatory status to "domestic." 
11 Dummy variables are based on the conventional classification of Japanese banks.  Besides three used for 
constructing dummy variables, long-term credit banks does not survive the construction of the analyzed sample, 
which will be discussed soon, and regional 2 banks are used as the base group. 
12 See Hancock and Wilcox (1994) for the discussion  
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has become standard for the recent empirical works of Japanese banks.13.  The data represents a 27 
year-long period from FY 1974 to FY 2000.  It contains not only balance sheets and income 
statements of all domestically licensed banks, but also bank loans classified by industry, allowing us 
comparison of loans supplied to various sectors.14 
In order to identify the banks’ reactions to loss of their own capital with the simultaneous falls 
in loans and capital by failed banks during the process of liquidation (or clean up of NPLs in 
preparation for handover to a new management), banks affected by bank failures, liquidated or 
nationalized banks as well as banks having experienced rescue mergers or acquisitions of failed 
banks, are dropped from the sample.15  As a result total of 126 banks remain in the sample.   
 
Disaggregating lending data into healthy and troubled industries 
    Non-performing loans reduce the firm’s net worth.  Large NPLs suggest that priority of the 
allocation of a firm’s resources is centered at servicing debts and that the firm is deprived of 
growing opportunities by investing into profitable projects.  An industry is labeled as a “troubled” 
industry if the share of NPLs to the industry within entire existing NPLs exceeds the share of total 
loans to the industry within entire loans as of the fiscal year end of 2000.  “Troubled” industries 
defined as such are real estate, construction, wholesale and retail, and service.  As displayed in 
Figure 1, they account for three-fourths of total NPLs, while only 46 percent of entire loans are 
directed to them.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Testing the “flight to quality” hypothesis against the “ever-greening” hypothesis is conducted 
                                                  
13 Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000), Hoshi and Kashyap (2000), Ueda (2000), and Hoshi (2001) 
14 Missing items on recent balance sheets of a few banks are supplemented by their annual reports. 
15 Banks having experienced non-rescue mergers are treated as single banks in pre-merger dates by adding values 
of variables for banks involved in the deals.  One long-term credit bank was dropped since detailed lending data 
for the 1980s are missing.  One regional 2 bank founded in the 1990s is also dropped.   
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by comparing results of estimated bank lending supply functions to “troubled” industries and to the 
rest (“non-troubled” industries). 
 
The capital measure 
    The ratio of book capital to total asset (book-based ratio) is used as a capital measure in 
running regressions of equation (1).  There are two other possible candidates, the BIS risk based 
capital asset ratio and the market-based capital asset ratio that includes unrealized gains (or losses) 
on holding assets as capital.  The book-based ratio is superior for two main reasons.  First, the 
Basel regulatory framework requires banks that at least 50 percent of regulatory capital necessary 
for their risk-adjusted asset be core (Tier 1) capital, which roughly corresponds to the book capital.  
Second, by normalizing capital by risk-“unadjusted” asset, we are able to isolate shocks to capital.  
Normalizing instead by risk-“adjusted” capital would result in the feedback effect from the growth 
of supply of loans (the dependent variable) to the capital asset ratio through the denominator (of the 
independent variable). 16   Besides, banks can control the level of BIS capital by issuing 
supplemental quasi-capital instruments such as subordinate debts in the wake of loss of core capital, 
and the Basel regulatory framework does not set the standard for the market-based ratio.17 
 
Estimation methodology 
We use the time-series average of each capital asset ratio measure for each bank over the fiscal 
years of 1992-1994 as a target.  The aggregate capital asset ratio of domestically licensed banks 
stays at a high plateau of around 5 percent since FY 1992 until FY 1994 (Figure 2).  It makes sense 
                                                  
16 The larger the outstanding loans are, the larger the risk adjusted asset is, and the smaller the risk-adjusted capital 
asset ratio is since loans are assigned the highest risk factor of 100 percent. 
17 Ito and Sasaki (1998) find that Japanese banks increased subordinate debts in response to their losses on core 
capital in the early 1990s. 
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to believe that banks have achieved their targets during this period.  Periods before and after the 
sample period are excluded because 1; the Basel regulatory framework did not take in full effect 
until FY 1992 and 2; they experienced large losses of bank capital in FY 1995 and in FY 1997.18  
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
The target constructed this way varies across banks but is time invariant.  Figure 3 shows that 
capital shocks are aggregate rather than idiosyncratic in nature and influence individual banks’ 
capital positions in a synchronized manner.  In FY 1997 all the banks were either short of or just 
achieved their targets.  Importantly, all of large banks were severely short of their targets.  In FY 
1998, in turn, many of banks drummed up their capital and had achieved their targets.  By FY 1999, 
most of banks restored their targets.  The time variant but cross-sectionally invariant reaction 
coefficient βtj is meant to capture the banks’ reaction to such aggregate shocks. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
The target may change over time as the regulatory and economic environments change.  The 
most important of economic factors to influence the bank’s target are arguably interest rates, which 
had stayed low and barely changed in the late 1990s.  Use of information from the period of shocks 
to bank capital in estimating the time variant target is problematic since the target estimated as such 
does not isolate a change in the target from a change in the actual capital position.19  Ignoring 
time-series changes in targets does not bias results on the direction of the banks’ distributive 
adjustments of lending supply much unless changes exhibit great idiosyncrasy.20  Supply cut of 
                                                  
18 The Basel Accord agreed in 1988 encouraged banks to accumulate adequate capital by the full implementation. 
19 Alternatively one may estimate the relationship between the banks' capital ratio and their characteristics (size, 
regulatory and institutional dummy variables from pre- crisis and post Basel years (1992-1994) and then compute 
fitted values for out of sample crisis years (1995-2000).  This would accommodate the banks' switch in regulatory 
status from higher to lower minimum capital requirement if they actually do so over FY 1995- FY 2000.  
Unfortunately the estimated relationship over 1992-1994 is very inaccurately estimated, and quite a number of 
banks have negative values for their targets estimated this way during FY 1997- FY 1999. 
20 A bank wide change in the banks’ targets, common to all the banks, simply changes capital “surpluses” of all the 
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lending to both “troubled” and “non-troubled” industries induced by shortfall to targets is 
underestimated by roughly an equal degree. 
We estimate equation (1) with a yearly panel of banks by interacting time dummies with 
explanatory variables to leave coefficients, including one on capital “surplus” Kit/Ait-(Ki/Ai)*, 
time-variant.21  We could restrict some of coefficients to be time invariant if they seem to be stable 
over time.22 
 
Simultaneity and identification 
The OLS estimator of the coefficient on the capital “surplus” measure β in equation (1) may 
capture not only the needed banks’ behavioral responses but also the potential demand side 
relationship.  If the economic condition worsens, firms adjust their investments downward, which 
in turn results in declining borrowing demand.  On the other hand, the firms’ sluggish sales 
performances may prevent them from earning revenues high enough to service their debts on time.  
Thus, their existing loans become non-performing, which reduces the lender banks’ capital.  
Similarly in an economic upturn, borrowing demand soars, while the higher profits of the banks are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
banks by an equal degree. 
21 Indeed resulting point estimates are numerically equivalent to those from separate cross sectional regressions.   
22 It is possible to interpret βtj (Ki/Ai)* obtained through expanding the bracket on the right hand side of 
equation (1) as the time-variant response of bank lending to the observed bank specific fixed effect.  Theoretically, 
one could model the time-variant response of bank lending supply to the standard unobservable fixed effect, which 
is incorporated in the regression equation as a time dummy, and identify the time-variant response and the fixed 
effect.  One could, then, test whether the “restricted” model with the estimated target outperforms the 
“unrestricted” model with the unobserved fixed effect by using, say, the log likelihood principle.  To make two 
regression results comparable by the standard test statistic, the set of instruments has to be shared by both models.  
Since bank dummies have to be included in the “unrestricted” model to ensure the high dimension of the set of 
instruments, so do in the original model.  The attempted inclusion of bank dummies as instruments in the 
“restricted” model resulted in implausible estimates.  Developing a new testing method is a good agenda in the 
future research. 
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added to their equity capital. 
In order to identify the bank lending supply function from the balance sheet data, we need a 
valid instrument that is independent of the error term εit and strongly correlated to the capital asset 
ratio, Kit/Ait.  The bank’s share of real estate lending within its lending portfolio in FY 1989, which 
we call REAL89, is a unique variable that satisfies conditions to be a good instrument.  It 
effectively overcomes the drawback of the classical approach in the literature to use lagged 
“predetermined” variables that lack an economic account of bank capital and whose correlation with 
bank capital is not guaranteed. 23 
Ueda (2000) and Hoshi (2001) find that the bank’s portfolio tilt toward the real estate industry 
in the 1980s best accounts for the size of the NPLs of that bank in the late 1990s.  In response to 
the loss of long-standing large keiretsu firms, which were beneficiaries of the financial liberalization 
(deregulation) and turned to financial markets to raise needed funds, banks made the structural 
reorganization of their customers to weigh more on the real estate companies, expecting that land 
prices would never fall.24  As the land price bubble busted, many real estate lending became bad 
loans, and later were recognized as NPLs on the bank’s financial statements in the late 1990s and ate 
capital. 
The banks’ behavioral responses to the deregulation in the mid-1980s are exogenous to the 
demand-supply system of bank lending in the 1990s, and REAL89 is independent of the error term 
in the lending supply function (1).  The instrumental variable regression with REAL89 thus picks 
up the bank’s response to a loss of bank capital due to its structural behavioral change in the 1980s 
and isolate out the effect of concurrent business cycles (demand side).25  REAL89 is strongly 
                                                  
23 See Peek and Rosengren (1995 a) and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000).  Peek and Rosengren (1995 a) adds the 
current change in equity capital as one of instruments to lagged variables. 
24 For more on the Japanese financial liberalization, see Hoshi and Kashyap (2000)  
25 REAL89 is meant to capture large falls in land prices due to the bubble burst that predominantly preceded a 
large loss of bank capital in the late 1990s.  A large loss of capital, though stemming from falls in land prices, had 
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negatively correlated to capital “surpluses” since FY 1995 (Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
4. Results 
Regression results 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the coefficient on the contemporaneous capital “surplus”, β, 
from the 2SLS regression of equation (1) with the panel of banks since FY 1995 through FY 2000.26   
The first raw presents the results on the bank lending supply to “troubled” industries not closely 
related to the real estate industry: industries included are wholesale and retail, and service.  The 
second raw labeled “non-troubled (2)” presents the results on lending supply to the healthy 
non-manufacturing industries little burdened with NPLs (agriculture, mining, financial and 
insurance, transportation and communications, and utility).  The third raw labeled “non-troubled 
(3)” presents the results on lending to healthy non-manufacturing industries excluding the financial 
and insurance industry (agriculture, mining, transportation and communications, and utility).27 
                                                                                                                                                                      
not occurred until the regulator urged banks to write off NPLs in FY 1997.  Changes in land prices in the late 
1990s are minor relative to the bust of land price bubble that had occurred earlier.  For instance, the land price in 
Tokyo fell 38 percent over a five-year period from FY 1991 to FY 1995, whereas it fell only 9 percent over a 
three-year period from FY 1997 to FY 1999.  Thus changes in land prices do not cause serious problems in 
interpreting the results of instrumental variable regressions in different years.  One way to take into account 
changes in land prices in the late 1990s are to use the product of REAL89 and the contemporaneous land price as 
an instrument.  REAL89 multiplied by the land price, however, loses a strong explanation power of bank capital 
in the sample. 
26 The regulator’s official notice on the rigorous assessment framework of bank assets was published on March 
5th, 1997, about a year before the fiscal year end of 1997.  So banks knew a year in advance that a large loss of 
capital was inevitable at the fiscal year end of 1997.  The regression equations with the lagged capital asset ratio 
were also examined.  When the contemporaneous ratio is significant and positive, so is generally the coefficient 
on the lagged ratio.  As the constructed capital “surplus” is a stock of capital less the time invariant target, it is 
strongly sereally correlated.  In fact regressions with both lagged and contemporaneous ratios wash away the 
statistical significance of coefficients on the lagged ratio.  Besides an overidentification test rejects the null 
hypothesis at 10 % level for the lag specification for troubled lending in fiscal years 1997. 
27 Some non-banks are said to have been engaged in intensive real estate related lending.  Though presence of 
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[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
The estimated coefficient is positive and weakly significant for “troubled” industries and is not 
statistically significant for lending supply to “non-troubled” industries in FY 1996.  In FY 1997 the 
estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant for lending supply to both groups of 
industries, though the point estimate is substantially larger for “non-troubled” industries than for 
“troubled” industries.28  The coefficient is estimated larger for “non-troubled” industries than for 
“troubled” industries in FY 1998, though it is not significant for “non-troubled” industries when they 
exclude the financial and insurance industry (FII).29 
 
Aggregate impact of bank capital 
    Table 3 compares actual aggregate growth rates of loans to “troubled” industries and to 
“non-troubled” industries.30  The fall in loans to “non-troubled” industries is larger than the fall in 
loans to “troubled” industries in FY 1997, 1998, and 2000.  In FY 1999 loans to “non-troubled” 
industries grew while loans to “troubled” industries fell.31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
NPLs to the industry is not outstanding from the data, we present the results on the healthy non-manufacturing 
industries excluding the financial and insurance industry to check robustness of the results. 
28 The OLS estimator provides statistically significant but substantially smaller point estimates of coefficients than 
does the 2SLS estimator in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 and insignificant estimates in FY 1998. (Results are not 
shown.) 
29 Regressions that take into account time effects (time-variant constant) and the time-variant coefficient on capital 
“surplus” but that keep other coefficients unchanged over time result in qualitatively similar results.  The LR tests 
do not reject such restrictions on coefficients. (Results are not shown.) 
30 The data are constructed from the micro data of banks included in the sample of the cross sectional regressions, 
thereby make them comparable to the aggregate supply side effects of bank capital on lending that are computed 
from the estimation of equation (1). 
31 Clean up of loans to jusen companies is the most likely cause of a positive growth of loans to “non-troubled” 
industries including the financial and insurance industry and a negative growth of loans to “non-troubled” 
industries excluding it in FY 1995 and FY 1996. 
   13
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Table 4 compares estimated aggregate growth rates of lending supply to “troubled” industries 
and to “non-troubled” industries induced by the banks’ capital positions.  Each entry aggregates the 
third term in (1) βjt {Kit/Ait-(Ki/Ai)*}.  The corresponding point estimate from Table 3 is used for βjt 
and the asset size is used as a weight.  The number measures the aggregate impact of the banks’ 
capital positions on bank lending supply in each year. 
The actual capital asset ratio is short of the target on average (aggregate capital “shortage”) in 
fiscal years for 1995, 1996, and 1997, and the actual ratio exceeds the target (aggregate capital 
“surplus”) afterward.32  Therefore, the greater entry for “troubled” industries (-4.7 percent) than for 
“non-troubled” industries (-8.5 percent if they include FII, and –7.4 percent if they exclude it.) in FY 
1997 strongly suggests the banks’ industry-wide ever-greening in response to a large loss of capital.  
Slightly larger entries for “non-troubled” industries than for “troubled” industries in the previous 
year (FY 1996) could support the banks’ flight to quality.  Larger entries for “non-troubled” 
industries in FY 1998 imply the positive allocative effect of the large public capital injection.  
Compared with Table 3, it is only in FY 1997 that the distribution of loan growth across “troubled” 
and “non-troubled” industries is strongly attributable to the banks’ capital positions. 
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Testing reallocation of lending portfolio 
    We attempt the formal statistical test to compare lending supply to “troubled” industries with 
that to “non-troubled” industries.  The regression equation used is obtained by subtracting the 
equation (1) for “non-troubled” industries (i=nt) from that for “troubled” industries (i=tr), and is 
estimated by the 2SLS with a set of instrumental variables employed being a union of sets of 
                                                  
32 A sign of the aggregated capital “surplus” coincides with the sign of the entry in the first column of Table 4 
because as shown in the second column of Table 2, the coefficient on the contemporaneous book-based capital 
asset ratio is positive in all fiscal years since FY 1995. 
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instruments used in running regressions of equation (1) for both “troubled” and “non-troubled” 
sectors.  REAL89 remains to play a key role as an identifier. 
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Though statistically insignificant, the point estimate is positive (βtr>βnt) in FY 1996 and negative 
(βtr<βnt) in FY 1997 when banks did not achieve their targets as an industry (years of the industry 
wide capital loss), suggesting the portfolio reorganization toward “non-troubled industries” (flight to 
quality) in FY 1996 and toward “troubled” industries (ever-greening) in FY 1997.  In FY 1998, a 
year of capital surge, the coefficient is significant and negative when “non-troubled” industries 
include FII.  In FY 1999, in turn, the coefficient is significant and positive when “non-troubled” 
industries exclude FII.  This result is due to the negative and insignificant coefficient for 
“non-troubled” industries and the positive and insignificant coefficient for “troubled” industries in 
FY 1999 on Table 2. 
High “partial squared correlation coefficients”, developed by Shea (1997) to test the strength of 
the set of instruments employed to explain a capital “surplus”, build further confidence in employed 
instrumental variables (Table 5-2).  The complete estimation results of equation (2) are presented in 
Tables 5-3 (“non-troubled” industries include FII) and 5-4 (“non-troubled” industries exclude FII).33  
[Insert Tables 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4 about here.] 
Robustness check 
In order to check on the robustness of our position, we replicate the regressions of equation (1) 
(Table 6-1), the actual growth rates of loans (Table 6-2), the estimated contribution of capital 
                                                  
33 Regressions that take into account time effects (time-variant constant) and the time-variant coefficient on capital 
“surplus” but that keep other coefficients unchanged over time result in very high standard errors for coefficients.  
None of them is statistically significant at 10 percent level though the LR tests do not reject such restrictions on 
coefficients. (Results are not shown.) 
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“surplus” to the distribution of supply of bank loans based on regression results in Table 6-1 (Table 
6-3), and the regression results of equation (2) (Table 6-4) with subgroups of banks.  Groups 
investigated are regional banks registered as “domestic” as of the fiscal year end of 2000 and 
regional 2 banks.34  The estimation results of equation (1) and equation (2) are largely consistent 
with findings with all banks in the constructed sample until FY 1997.  Regional and regional 2 
banks continue to be slightly short of capital and seem to ever-green “troubled” borrowers in FY 
1998. 
[Insert Tables 6-1, 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4 about here.] 
Interpretation of empirical results 
The estimated contraction of loan supply to healthy non-manufacturing industries by 7 to 9 
percent in FY 1997 induced by undercapitalization of banks demonstrates that the large loss of 
capital primarily due to the regulator’s tougher stance against banks to request more rigorous 
assessment of their assets caused a credit crunch.  More interestingly, banks did not reduce lending 
supply to unhealthy industries as much as to healthy industries, implying that they ever-greened 
“troubled ” borrowers.35  A large loss of capital must have attracted banks to the short eye-sighted 
accounting solution to drum up the capital to asset ratio.  Indeed, the results for FY 1996 are 
suggestive of the opposite, the portfolio shift toward healthy industries in response to a minor capital 
loss, flight to quality.  Results in later years when banks recovered their targets are not conclusive.  
The initial large positive capital shock primarily due to public capital infusion into large banks in FY 
1998 seems to have assisted these banks in rebalancing their lending portfolio toward healthy 
                                                  
34 14 regional banks that register as international banks that pertain to the higher minimum capital standard are 
excluded from the regional bank sub-sample.  It serves to test our hypotheses with the very homogeneous 
sub-sample.  All regional 2 banks are registered as domestic banks that are subject to the lower standard. 
35 Since there are a greater number of write offs of NPLs in “troubled” industries and disposal of NPLs reduces 
both loans and capital equally, the disparity in new lending between “troubled” and “healthy” industries must be 
even more pronounced. 
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industries and thus had an industry wide impact of improving the quality of lending supply.36 
 
5. Conclusion 
    In this paper we estimated the bank lending supply function consistent with the dynamic 
optimization of the bank regulated by the Basel framework using a powerful identification strategy 
with a unique instrument.  We found that a large loss of bank capital caused by the regulator’s 
tougher policy against banks in FY 1997 not only caused the contraction of bank lending supply 
(credit crunch), but also were likely to cause the banks’ reallocation of lending supply to unhealthy 
industries with higher concentration of non-performing loans (ever-greening).  It casts a sharp 
contrast with the same banks in the previous year, little short of their targets, that indeed weighed 
more on the healthier industries.  Our findings also imply that public bail out of banks in FY 1998 
helped banks escape from further quantitative and qualitative deterioration of lending supply. 
                                                  
36 Public funds injected into the banking system amounted to 58,090 million yen.  Funds were selectively 
supplied to larger banks, most of which were severely undercapitalized at the time of action, thereby were effective 
to restore the aggregate lending growth in the highly concentrated Japanese banking industry. 
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 Figure 1. Non-performing loans and total loans by industry 
Source: the BOJ (2001) 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic loan growth and capital asset ratio of domestically licensed 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1990.07 1991.07 1992.07 1993.07 1994.07 1995.07 1996.07 1997.07 1998.07 1999.07 2000.07
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
Lending growth Capital asset ratio
27.1 21.5
13.2
16.0
14.7
10.8
5.6
9.3 5.1
9.1
2.0
4.7
8.2
25.812.5 14.5
Non-performing Loans
Total Loans
Real estate Service
Wholesale/Retail Construction
Manufacturing Finance/Insurance
Transportation/Communications Other
   21
Figure 3 Target and actual capital asset ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The vertical axis represents the actual capital to asset ratio, and the horizontal axis represents the target ratio.  
Thus, banks above the 45-degree line are in shortage of actual capital relative to its target, whereas those below the 
45-degree line are in surplus of actual capital relative to its target. 
Blue circles, black crosses, and red crosses are large banks, regional banks, and regional 2 banks, respectively. 
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Table 1 Correlation coefficients of REAL89 and capital “surplus” measures 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
CAPR -0.4607 -0.2767 -0.5345 -0.3443 -0.3214 -0.4358 
 
 
Table 2 Year by year coefficients on capital “surplus” measures for loan supply to troubled and non-troubled 
industries, all 126 banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *** shows 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%, respectively. 
The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded in the 
second row. 
 
 
Table 3 Aggregate lending growths to troubled and non-troubled industries 
 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Troubled (1) -0.43 -1.51 -2.12 -2.61 -2.98 -2.56 
Non- troubled (2) -1.10 -4.65 -3.92 -5.41 4.08 -5.00 All banks 
Non- troubled (3)  3.24  0.79 -2.56 -3.95 2.13 -3.57 
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded in the 
second row. 
 
 
Table 4 Aggregate capital shocks to bank lending supply to troubled and non-troubled industries, all 126 banks 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Troubled (1) -1.61 -1.06* -4.65*** 1.00* 0.78 0.68* 
Non- troubled (2) -1.68 0.87 -8.54*** 3.82** -1.85 2.29** 
Non- troubled (3)   -1.75   -0.88 -7.43** 1.60  -3.34 0.51 
 
Note: *** shows 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%, respectively. 
The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded 
in the second row. 
 
 
Group of industries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
3.3626 2.5416*  4.9944*** 2.5271* 1.1473 1.3214* Troubled (1) 
(1.2284) (1.6936) (4.1249) (1.8360) (0.9917) (1.9003)
3.5128 -2.0894  9.1686***  9.6862** -2.7237  4.4350**Non- troubled (2) 
(0.3291) (-0.3604) (2.9483) (2.6077) (-0.7951) (2.6075)
3.6581  2.1016 7.9786** 4.0622 -4.9156 0.9873 Non- troubled (3) 
    (0.5480) (0.2800) (2.3815) (0.9929) (-1.5066) (0.4845)
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Table 5-1 Year by year coefficients on capital “surplus” measures in equation (2), all 126 banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-2 Partial squared correlation coefficients 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Non-troubled includes 
financial and insurance 0.0916 0.1305 0.1734 0.0960 0.1495 0.2403
Non-troubled excludes 
financial and insurance 0.1090 0.1267 0.2039 0.1025 0.1592 0.2167
 
 
Table 5-3 Regression results of equation (2), “non-troubled” industries include the financial and insurance industry 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 0.0027 -0.0195 -0.0366  -0.0523** -0.0284 -0.0218 Constant 
(0.1204) (-0.9187) (-1.5142) (-2.3256) (-1.2246) (-0.8286) 
-0.1793  0.3056 -0.4372 0.2261 -0.0402 -0.1179 Lagged growth of 
“troubled” lending (-0.4678) (0.8667) (-1.1874) (0.7962) (-0.1553) (-0.4206) 
-0.0197 -0.2663 -0.0791 0.1542 0.1145   0.1815**Lagged growth of “non- 
troubled” lending (-0.1034) (-1.5445) (-0.4665) (1.2626) (1.0738) (2.2240) 
4.2215  6.4602 -4.3578  -7.7444** 3.1321 -2.1843 Capital “surplus” 
(0.3807) (1.2795) (-1.3532) (-2.1423) (1.0909) (-1.1048) 
-0.0077   0.1721* -0.0536  0.1603** -0.0897   0.1121**CITY 
(-0.0808) (1.7695) (-0.5896) (2.5738) (-1.1750) (2.1058) 
0.0922  0.0529 -0.0226 0.0247 -0.0290 -0.0562 TRUST 
(0.4279) (0.7081) (-0.2657) (0.3886) (-0.3638) (-1.0024) 
0.0094  0.0307  0.0171  0.0687* -0.0064  0.0030 REGIONAL 
(0.3081) (0.9706) (0.5512) (1.9236) (-0.1974) (0.0850) 
48.3256    J statistics 
(0.2326) 
Number of observations 756 
 
Note: *** shows 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%, respectively. 
Numbers shown in parentheses below J statistics are p-value 
 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
  4.2215    6.4602 -4.3578   -7.7444**   3.1321    -2.1843 Non-troubled includes
financial and insurance (0.3807) (1.2795) (-1.3532) (-2.1423) (1.0909) (-1.1048)
  0.6162   4.1433  -3.4977  -1.4617    6.9203**   2.5125Non-troubled excludes
financial and insurance (0.0545) (0.6964) (-1.6156) (-0.5053) (2.5379) (0.5701)
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded in 
the second row. 
*** shows 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%, respectively. 
The Hansen’s (1982) overidentification test does not reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with a set of 
explanatory variables for any regression at least at 10 % level. (Results are not shown.) 
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Table 5-4 Regression results of equation (2), “non-troubled” industries exclude the financial and insurance industry 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
-0.0004 -0.0043 -0.0223 -0.0295 -0.0373 -0.0370 Constant 
(-0.0167) (-0.1811) (-0.8831) (-1.2132) (-1.4242) (-1.2618)
0.1982 0.6163 -0.1555 0.2369 -0.3788   -0.7806**Lagged growth of 
“troubled” lending (0.4496) (1.5123) (-0.3777) (0.7133) (-1.3073) (-2.3764)
-0.1152 -0.3039*    0.4228*** 0.0220    0.3836**   0.4366***Lagged growth of “non- 
troubled” lending (-0.6076) (-1.7086) (2.6961) (0.1362) (2.6874) (3.5876)
0.6162 4.1433 -3.4977 -1.4617   6.9203** 2.5125 Capital “surplus” 
(0.0547) (0.6983) (-1.0207) (-0.3730) (2.1942) (1.0621)
-0.0697 0.0822 0.0945  0.0877 -0.0193 0.1470 CITY 
(-0.6742) (0.7172) (0.9696) (1.2710) (-0.2208) (2.4376)
0.0534 -0.0294 -0.1143* 0.0084 -0.0162 -0.0665 TRUST 
(0.2426) (-0.3507) (-1.1533) (0.1134) (-0.1826) (-1.0370)
-0.0416 -0.0568 -0.0652* 0.0173 -0.0192 -0.0191 REGIONAL 
(-1.2969) (-1.6511) (-1.8592) (0.4519) (-0.5424) (-0.4377)
   J statistics 38.1291 (0.6416)  Number of observations 756  
Note: *** shows 1%, **, 5%, and *, 10%, respectively and numbers shown in parentheses below J statistics are 
p-value 
 
 
Table 6-1 Year by year coefficients on capital “surplus” measures for lending to non real estate related troubled 
industries and non-troubled non-manufacturing lending, 49 regional banks and 48 regional 2 banks 
 
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded in 
the second row 
Group of banks Group of industries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
2.6118  3.2901** 2.6871*** 0.3197 -0.1317 1.1814 
Troubled (1) 
(1.3105) (2.5962) (3.1355) (0.3654) (-0.1940) (1.5444)
7.4764 0.9829   6.4116** 8.4511*** 2.1911 3.7935 
Non- troubled (2) 
(1.0852) (0.2408) (2.4376) (3.2231) (0.8809) (1.3715)
  8.8643**   2.5162     7.4871***    0.6933   0.6287   0.3452 
Regional banks 
Non- troubled (3) 
    (2.1655)     (0.9362)     (4.3593)     (0.3627)     (0.4176)     (0.2072)
2.2091 -0.5911   2.7030** -0.7175 -0.2468  0.2628 
Troubled (1) 
(0.5063) (-0.3848) (2.3685) (-0.6158) (-0.2087) (0.4018)
-0.4540  1.4291  1.8580 -0.5111   -7.1490** -0.1052 
Non- troubled (2) 
(-0.0372) (0.2908) (0.5693) (-0.1963) (-2.1725) (-0.0585)
   3.1815   -1.6176     5.9665**    -1.4371   -2.5750   -2.4209 
Regional 2 banks 
Non- troubled (3) 
    (0.2989)    (-0.3824)     (2.3744)    (-0.6674)    (-0.9540)    (-1.5821)
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Table 6-2 Aggregate lending growths to troubled and non-troubled industries 
 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Troubled (1)  1.14 -0.41 -0.77 -2.28 -6.55 -2.85 
Non- troubled (2) -1.77 -4.38 -0.91 -2.53 -2.11  1.64 Regional banks 
Non- troubled (3)  0.25  4.12  3.18 -0.01 -4.84 -1.83 
Troubled (1) 1.40 0.59 -0.89 -1.25 -4.25 -1.75 
Non- troubled (2) 4.68 2.95 -0.20 0.32 -2.70 -1.24 Regional 2 banks 
Non- troubled (3) 4.27 3.51 -0.49 0.35 -1.60 -0.26 
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the first row and is excluded in the 
second row. 
 
 
Table 6-3 Aggregate capital shocks to bank lending supply, 49 regional banks and 48 regional 2 banks 
 
 Group of banks  Group of industries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Troubled (1) -0.62 -0.50** -1.03*** -0.09 -0.03 0.93 
Non- troubled (2) -1.79 -0.15  -2.45**   -2.25*** 0.42 2.97 Regional banks 
Non- troubled (3)  -2.12** -0.38  -2.86*** -0.18 0.12 0.26 
Troubled (1) -0.14 0.04 -1.62***  0.22 -0.07 0.11 
Non- troubled (2)  0.03 -0.09 -1.11  0.16 -2.02** -0.04 Regional 2 banks 
Non- troubled (3)  -0.02  0.01 -3.57**  0.45 -0.73 -0.01 
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the second row and is excluded in the 
third row. 
 
Table 6-4 Year by year coefficients on capital “surplus” measures in equation (2), regional and regional 2 banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The financial and insurance industry is included into the “non-troubled” industries in the second row and is excluded in the 
third row. 
Group of banks Non-troubled 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
-2.8951 2.2041 -3.3497  -10.7439*** -3.5227 -3.2139 Includes the financial 
and insurance (-0.3535) (0.5364) (-1.1592) (-2.7430) (-1.5178) (-1.1686)
 -6.8577  -0.9769   -3.8516** -0.9903 0.1279  1.1594 
Regional banks 
Excludes the financial 
and insurance (-1.6330) (-0.3891) (-2.2573) (-0.4251) (0.0992) (0.7648)
4.3710 -4.0779  1.2172 -5.2666  7.3340** 1.3179 Includes the financial 
and insurance (0.3255) (-0.8131) (0.3382) (-1.4572) (2.1364) (0.6850)
4.4535 -0.2184  -2.5262  0.2135 3.4526  3.0973* 
Regional 2 banks 
Excludes the financial 
and insurance (0.3902) (-0.0511) (-0.8723) (0.0706) (1.2271) (1.8563)
